(...Continued)

Kunstler suggests the peak may be this year (2005), but he, and Heinberg, point out that it will only be possible to assign the exact date after the fact since rising prices for energy may slow economic growth and reduce demand for energy and thus delay the peak. But if demand for oil increases, as countries like China and India industrialize, while production decreases, we can expect rapidly rising prices. Most of us will experience the end of oil in the form of prices we cannot afford to pay. Both writers also point out that the second half of oil still in the ground is harder to get out. Much may be left in the ground because of a negative ERoEI, less energy returned over energy invested. Both writers also include a chapter evaluating alternatives to oil, and many, including the much-touted hydrogen economy, have a negative ERoEI. Most alternatives are also dependent on the existing fossil fuel platform. As a highly
concentrated liquid fuel, oil has no ready substitute. Conservation and energy-efficient cars and appliances, along with renewable energy from wind and sun, may provide energy for a slow, rather than precipituous, decline.

Both Heinberg and Kunstler argue that the economic effects of peak oil will be fairly sudden and soon. They provide careful reasoning to support the likelihood that industrialized countries dependent on what had been cheap oil will suffer serious and irreversible economic decline. In other words, they are predicting the end of the world as we know it. And, because Americans are used to having ever larger amounts of cheap energy, what these writers are saying is simply incredible. We have been told that the sky is falling ever since Chicken Little, and some skepticism may be in order. But before we dismiss these books we must remember that it is, or was, the fossil fuel era that is the anomaly. The twentieth century was unique. So we are facing not the end of the world, but a return to a more normal world. Unfortunately, because cheap oil made cheap food possible, the growth of population exceeded normal carrying capacity. Heinberg includes a graph in his book (his graphs and charts are very helpful) which shows the correlation between energy use and population growth. It also shows global population falling from 7 billion to below 4 billion later in the twenty first century.

Kunstler includes a chapter on "Geopolitics and the Global Oil Peak," and, while it is difficult to speculate about the future, it is useful exercise. Certainly the competition over oil will be intense. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq may be only a beginning. If and when ordinary Americans begin to feel energy shortages they may call for even more desperate remedies. The Bush administration certainly seems willing to try to prolong its oil-based empire. Such resource wars could take more lives and waste energy. If successful they would only postpone the inevitable end of oil, but they could fail. Our wealth is loaned to us by foreign investments, and there is already much resentment in the world over the fact that the United States, with less than 5% of the world's population, uses 25% of its oil. Kunstler also has a chapter on some of the problems related to fossil fuel use: climate change, epidemic disease, water scarcity, and habitat destruction, among others. All these will exacerbate problems caused by rising energy prices and their devastating economic effects.

When we think about energy shortages, those of us who are older remember the long lines at gas pumps during the Arab oil embargo in 1973. Transportation will definitely be curtailed as oil prices rise. Mass transport could supplement private cars, so there may be options.

But it is the global food system, in which food travels an average of 1500 miles, that will be most decisively impacted. In addition to transportation both Heinberg and Kunstler remind us that the industrialized food system is dependent on fossil fuels for fertilizer, irrigation, pesticides, fuel in tractors and for food processing. Both authors emphasize the fact that food will have to be produced locally. And since organic methods of production require as much as 30% less fossil fuel energy, they will be preferable. Even less is needed when more work is done by human labor, or by draft animals, especially in small vegetable operations.

Heinberg, who came to this book after writing on human ecology, has given us a tightly-organized and clear guide to the issues involved in peak oil. Kunstler, who had published novels and books on the folly of suburbia, wrote his book in a more impressionistic and meandering manner. Although it includes details that may not be accurate, his discussion of land redistribution during the Long Emergency is important. Since land ownership is concentrated in fewer hands, a new fuedalism may emerge. His prejudice against suburbia, however, blinds him to the possibility of small-scale food production on larger suburban homesites. Both books conclude with interesting chapters on what life in the United States will or could be like after the collapse of industrial modes of production. Both hold out the hope that in spite of resentments and scapegoating by those who suffer the heaviest losses, at least some areas in this country may be able to maintain an orderly society.

Although neo-agrarian writers such as Wendell Berry have written to promote small-scale farming and household food production for over thirty years, it is a sad irony to realize that this alternative to the corporate food system may be thrust upon us rather than freely chosen. Still, the sooner that more people chose this possibility, both as growers and eaters, the easier it will be to manage the transition. Organizations such as MOFFA (Michigan Organic Food and Farm Alliance) have been advocating local organic food systems that revitalize and sustain local communities. Such communities can be a safety net at a time when hunger leads to civil unrest.